Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.
Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw
Date: 05-23-2021
Case Style:
State of New Mexico v. Matthew Wayne Hague
Case Number: A-1-CA-39349 & A-1-CA-39350
Judge: Jennifer L. Attrep
Court: IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Plaintiff's Attorney: Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
Santa Fe, NM - Criminal defense attorney represented MATTHEW WAYNE HAGUE with a revocation of
his probation.
We will begin with the motion to amend, by which Defendant seeks to
9 challenge the district court’s reliance upon his own out-of-court admission to
10 committing the offense of shoplifting. [MIO 5-9] Although we find no indication
11 that Defendant objected, [MIO 6] we understand him to suggest that the district court
12 should have excluded it, sua sponte, as unreliable hearsay. [MIO 6-9] However, a
13 statement is not hearsay when it is offered against a party and is the party’s own
14 admission. See Rule 11-801(D)(2)(a) NMRA (excluding admissions by a party15 opponent from the hearsay rule); see, e.g., State v. Smith, 2001-NMSC-004, ¶¶ 17-
16 18, 130 N.M. 117, 19 P.3d 254 (concluding that a police officer’s testimony about
17 the defendant’s own statements was properly admitted under Rule 11-801(D)(2)(a);
18 and further, the admission of such evidence did not implicate the defendant’s right
1 Because Defendant’s appeals raise identical issues, we exercise our
discretion to consolidate them for decision. See Rule 12-317(B) NMRA (allowing
an appellate court to consolidate appeals for decision).
3
1 of confrontation). We therefore perceive no merit to the suggestion of error.
2 Accordingly, we deny the motion to amend on the ground that the putative issue is
3 not viable. See generally State v. Sommer, 1994-NMCA-070, ¶ 11, 118 N.M. 58,
4 878 P.2d 1007 (observing parenthetically, in relation to motions to amend docketing
5 statements, that issues must be viable).
6 {3} Defendant also renews his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
7 support the district court’s determination that he committed a violation. [DS 10-12]
8 However, as described in the notices of proposed summary disposition, the State
9 presented ample evidence in support of the petition to revoke. [CN 2-4] Although
10 Defendant continues to argue that the district court’s reliance upon hearsay was
11 improper, [MIO 10-12] we remain unpersuaded. As we previously observed, [CN 3]
12 “hearsay may be considered in probation revocation hearings if of probative
13 value[.]” State v. Vigil, 1982-NMCA-058, ¶ 19, 97 N.M. 749, 643 P.2d 618 (internal
14 quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Neal, 2007-NMCA-086,
15 ¶ 41, 142 N.M. 487, 167 P.3d 935 (“[H]earsay evidence may be used in probation
16 revocation hearings if it has probative value.”). In this case the State’s evidence was
17 of substantial probative value, particularly in light of the fact that the investigating
18 officer was called as a witness at the probation revocation proceeding and was
19 therefore subject to cross-examination. See generally State v. Guthrie, 2011-NMSC20 014, ¶ 36, 150 N.M. 84, 257 P.3d 904 (observing that “an allegation that the
4
1 probationer has committed another crime must be tested in the crucible of cross2 examination”); Vigil, 1982-NMCA-058, ¶¶ 18, 22-24 (explaining that the absence
3 of opportunity to test hearsay for accuracy or reliability, through cross-examination
4 or otherwise, tends to deprive that evidence of probative value).
5 {4} Defendant suggests that Vigil would support a different result. [MIO 11]
6 However, unlike Vigil, this is not a case in which the State relied exclusively upon
7 hearsay evidence. See generally Neal, 2007-NMCA-086, ¶ 42 (observing that Vigil
8 “addresses only whether hearsay evidence was sufficient when no non-hearsay
9 evidence was presented”). As noted above, Defendant’s admission constitutes non10 hearsay. See Rule 11-801(D)(2)(a). And as we previously observed, [CN 3-4] the
11 testifying officer described his own perceptions, and events within his personal
12 knowledge. See State v. Gwynne, 2018-NMCA-033, ¶¶ 7, 28-33, 417 P.3d 1157
13 (holding that an investigating officer was properly permitted to describe the personal
14 observations he made from watching video recordings, to explain how he concluded
15 that the defendant was the perpetrator); State v. Sweat, 2017-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 20-24,
16 404 P.3d 20 (holding that an investigating officer was properly permitted to testify
17 as to the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of an offense captured on surveillance
18 video and subsequently viewed by the officer); Neal, 2007-NMCA-086, ¶ 42
19 (holding that the testimony of an officer who testified that he saw the defendant
5
1 shoplift constituted non-hearsay evidence, where the defendant was able to cross2 examine the officer). We therefore remain unpersuaded.
3 {5} Finally, Defendant contends that the district court’s ultimate ruling was
4 premised on “contradictory evidentiary rulings.” [MIO 11-12] The various positions
5 apparently taken by the district court on evidentiary matters pertaining to the
6 officer’s description of the course of the investigation, including his personal
7 perceptions based upon his viewing of the surveillance video and his subsequent
8 interaction with Defendant, [MIO 3-5] are somewhat mystifying. See generally Rule
9 11-1101(D)(3)(d) NMRA (stating that the rules of evidence do not apply to
10 proceedings to revoke probation). However, any error appears to have entailed the
11 exclusion of evidence, which would have redounded to Defendant’s benefit. Despite
12 this, the district court clearly manifested its determination that the State had
13 sustained its burden of demonstrating that Defendant had committed the offense of
14 shoplifting. As previously described, the evidence amply supports that result. We
15 therefore perceive no basis for relief on appeal. See generally Neal, 2007-NMCA16 086, ¶ 42 (explaining, in the context of a probation revocation proceeding, that in
17 order to establish a violation of due process, a defendant must show prejudice); City
18 of Roswell v. Smith, 2006-NMCA-040, 139 N.M. 381, 133 P.3d 271 (“We will affirm
19 a ruling of the district court that reaches the correct result, even if it is for the wrong
6
1 reason, when the district court had all the facts before it and the parties had a full
2 opportunity to present evidence.”).
Outcome: Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the notices of proposed summary disposition and above, we affirm.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: